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Abstract—The Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA)
specification in the IEEE 802.11e standard supports hetero-
geneous backoff parameters and arbitration inter-frame space
(AIFS), which makes a selfish node easy to manipulate these
parameters and misbehave. In this case, the network-wide fair-
ness cannot be achieved any longer. Many existing misbehavior
detectors, primarily designed for legacy IEEE 802.11 networks,
become inapplicable in such a heterogeneous network config-
uration. In this paper, we propose a novel real-time hybrid-
share (HS) misbehavior detector for IEEE 802.11e based wireless
local area networks (WLANs). The detector keeps updating its
state based on every successful transmission and makes detection
decisions by comparing its state with a threshold. We develop
mathematical analysis of the detector performance in terms of
both false positive rate and average detection rate. Numerical
results show that the proposed detector can effectively detect
both contention window based and AIFS based misbehavior with
only a short detection window.
Index Terms—IEEE 802.11e; contention window; AIFS; mis-
behavior detection; real-time; false positive rate; detection rate
I. INTRODUCTION
To support rapid growing applications (especially multime-
dia ones) of wireless local area networks (WLANs), the IEEE
802.11e standard adopts the Enhanced Distributed Channel
Access (EDCA) mechanism to provide media access control
(MAC) level differentiation in quality of service (QoS) [1],
[2]. With EDCA, network traffic is prioritized and classified
into several access categories (ACs). Service differentiation
is realized by assigning different parameters for each AC,
including the minimum and maximum contention window
sizes (CWmin and CWmax, respectively), the arbitration inter-
frame space (AIFS) number and transmission opportunity
(TXOP) limit [3].
In IEEE 802.11e based WLANs, a selfish/misbehaving
node can deliberately manipulate those parameters to gain
advantage over others. For example, it can use a smaller AIFS
to wait for shorter time than others in the same AC before
accessing the medium. As a result, it can access the medium
more frequently, and hence gain a higher priority for data
transmission. It is even possible for an intensively misbehaving
node to block the transmissions from other nodes and cause
the so-called denial of service attack. Therefore, real-time
misbehavior detection is demanded in order to isolate such
a node and alleviate its impact to the network.
Due to the random access which is based on the carrier sense
and multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
MAC protocol, we usually need to monitor each node for
a period of time to judge whether it is misbehaving or not.
Since it is difficult to extract necessary information from
collided transmissions, information conveyed in successful
transmissions is perhaps the only measurement can be uti-
lized for detection. Toledo et al. proposed to detect backoff
misbehavior by checking whether the idle time between con-
secutive successful transmissions from a target node obeys
the normal distribution [4]. Exploiting the fairness property
across the network, Tang et al. designed a light-weight fair-
share detector, which does not rely on the idle time distribution
[5]. However, with multiple ACs in an IEEE 802.11e WLAN,
the network-wide fairness as achieved in legacy IEEE 802.11
based networks dose not hold any longer [6], making the above
detectors generally inapplicable.
To detect backoff misbehavior in IEEE 802.11e networks,
Szott et al. proposed a χ2 detector by comparing the measured
and expected backoff values [7]. However, the exact values of
backoff periods followed by unsuccessful transmissions may
be hard to measure. The detector in [8], however, takes advan-
tage of the fact that the interval between two consecutive suc-
cessful transmissions is uniformly distributed in [0, CWmin)
providing that the packet in the second transmission was not
retransmitted before. Nevertheless, the detector delay could be
very high. While there are works well addressed the TXOP
misbehavior [9], efficient and real-time detection of contention
window and AIFS misbehavior still remains open.
In this paper, we propose a new detector to deal with
misbehavior in IEEE 802.11e networks. We focus on both
contention window and AIFS misbehavior. The major con-
tributions in this paper can be summarized as follows. We
analyze the misbehavior strategy in IEEE 802.11e networks
and show that a selfish node can gain significant advantage
over other nodes by manipulating its contention window or
AIFS. We also demonstrate that the existing fair-share based
detector for legacy IEEE 802.11 networks is unable to detect
certain misbehavior in the IEEE 802.11e cases with multiple
priority classes. Then, we propose a mathematical model of
the percentage of resource sharing for a node in each priority
class. Based on this, we design a novel hybrid-share detector
and develop analytical results of the detector performance in
terms of false positive rate and average detection rate. We
2also present numerical results to demonstrate the performance
in various aspects including different threshold, misbehaving
intensity and detection window. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows. Section II overviews the problem.
Following the mathematical MAC model in Section III, our
detector is designed and evaluated in Section IV. Numerical
results are presented in Section V and the paper is concluded
in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM OVERVIEW
A. IEEE 802.11e EDCA
In IEEE 802.11 based wireless local area networks
(WLANs), the channel access among nodes is coordinated by
the CSMA/CA mechanism. Time is divided into equal slots.
Before transmission, a node should sense the medium idle until
a backoff timer expires. Each node takes the binary exponen-
tial backoff strategy to access the channel with the backoff
timer at each backoff stage initialized at a value randomly
chosen from [0, CW − 1]. The contention window size CW
is initialized at CWmin and doubles (until CWmax) once a
transmission is unsuccessful (a packet will be retransmitted
at most for a certain number of times). Once the medium is
busy, the backoff timer will be suspended until it becomes
idle again. The CSMA/CA mechanism also uses an inter-
frame space time to defer a transmission or backoff period
in order to give way to high priority messages. Unlike the
distributed coordination function (DCF) mechanism in legacy
IEEE 802.11 standard, the Enhanced Distributed Channel
Access (EDCA) specification in IEEE 802.11e supports hybrid
backoff parameters and arbitration inter-frame space (AIFS).
In default, there are four priority classes (access categories)
defined in IEEE 802.11e EDCA [3], as shown in Table II-A.
TABLE I
EDCA DEFAULT SETTINGS.
Access category CWmin CWmax AIFSN
Background ACBK aCWmin aCWmax 7
Best Effort ACBE aCWmin aCWmax 3
Video ACVI (aCWmin+1)/2-1 aCWmin 2
Voice ACVO (aCWmin+1)/4-1 (aCWmin+1)/2-1 2
In this paper, we consider the general cases that there
are c priority classes, each of which is assigned contention
window sizes CWmini and CWmaxi, and inter-frame space
AIFSi=AIFSNi*aSlotTime+aSIFSTime, where AIFSN is the
number of slots after a short inter-frame space duration a node
should defer before either invoking a backoff or starting a
transmission. The parameters are assigned by the AP.
B. Misbehavior Analysis
A misbehaving node may use different parameters other
than those assigned by the AP, to gain a higher sharing of
the resource. Fig. 1 illustrates the impact of a misbehaving
node and shows the percentages of resource sharing of the
misbehaving node and a normal node. Here, the percentage
of resource sharing is defined as the portion of throughput
contribution from a particular node over the total network
throughput. In this figure, we consider a network consisting of
10 normal nodes and one misbehaving node. Each node always
has packets in its buffer for sending out. Each normal node
takes MAC parameters as CWmin = 15,CWmax = 1023 and
AIFSN = 2, while the misbehaving node takes CWmin = 1 ∼
32,CWmax = 1023 and AIFSN = 0 ∼ 2.
The figure clearly demonstrates that the misbehaving node
can gain significant advantage over the other nodes by manipu-
lating its MAC parameters. Moreover, the impacts of CWmin
and AIFSN are different. For example, in order to achieve
10% more throughput, the misbehaving node needs to reduce
its CWmin to a much smaller value (e.g., from 15 to less than
7); while, this can also be achieved by simply reducing its
AIFSN from 2 to 1. In other words, the misbehaving impact
on the network is more sensitive to AIFSN than CWmin.
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Fig. 1. Impact of MAC misbehavior.
In this paper, we consider both CWmin and AIFSN misbe-
havior. While the proposed detector is also effective for CW-
max misbehavior, a malicious node may prefer to manipulate
CWmin over CWmax since the former strategy has greater
impact. We focus on saturated traffic case, i.e., each node
always has packets for transmitting to the AP. Otherwise, for a
light-loaded network, a misbehaving node may not have much
impact on the other normal nodes. Our problem is to detect
such misbehavior at the AP in real-time.
C. Fair-Share Detector and Challenges
Consider a WLAN consisting of one AP and n nodes which
locate inside each other’s communication range. The nodes
compete for accessing a channel and sending packets to the
AP. In the legacy IEEE 802.11 standard, the DCF mechanism
guarantees that each node will share the same portion of the
channel resource and maintains fairness across the network.
For an arbitrary node v, let a binary variable Iv be the indicator
of whether a packet received by the AP is from node v or not.
In normal cases, due to the network-wide fairness guarantee,
we have probability P[Iv = 1] = 1n .
A misbehaving node can gain unfair share of the resource
by manipulating its backoff parameters, e.g, using a smaller
CWmin. If the AP records all the received packets, it can
notice that more packets are from the selfish one, i.e., P[Iv =
1] > 1
n
if v is misbehaving. In [5], we take advantage of
this important feature to design a nonparametric cumulative
sum (CUSUM) based fair-share misbehavior detector (called
3FS detector) to detect such misbehavior in real-time, which is
described as follows.
For a target node v, let Xk be the state of the detector for v.
Xk initializes at 0, i.e., X0 = 0. For the kth packet received
by the AP, the state of the detector is updated as follows.
Xk+1 = [Xk + (nIk − 1)]
+
, (1)
where x+ = x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. In other words, if the
packet is from v, we have Ik = 1 and Xk+1 = Xk + n− 1;
otherwise, Ik = 0 and Xk+1 = Xk − 1. The idea behind
is that, due to fair sharing, the nodes roughly take turns to
transmit packets. Therefore, the detector state Xk is likely
to be bounded. In presence of misbehaving nodes, since
P[Iv = 1] >
1
n
, the unfair portion of channel sharing will
accumulate such that the state of the FS detector associated
with each misbehaving node finally becomes unbounded.
Thus, we can employ a detection threshold h to decide whether
v is misbehaving (i.e., δk = 1) or not (i.e., δk = 0) as follows.
δk =
{
1, if Xk ≥ h,
0, otherwise. (2)
Because every received packet is counted by the AP in
making the detection decisions, with satisfactory accuracy,
the FS detector can identify the misbehaving node much
faster than many existing detectors. Moreover, the FS detector
is nonparametric and lightweight in terms of computation
complexity, it is thereby able to provide real-time misbehavior
detection services [5].
Because the underlying assumption of network-wide fair-
ness no longer holds in the EDCA situation, the FS detector
cannot be applied directly in networks with hybrid priority
classes. However, since sub-network fairness can be still
achieved among the nodes in the same class, a direct extension
of the FS detector is to design a distinct one for each class.
Specifically, for a node in class i, the associated detector
should use the number of nodes in this class other than a
common n across the whole network as in (1). Nevertheless,
such extended FS detector encounters two challenges:
• If there is only one node in a class, its misbehavior may
not be detected. To see this, substituting n = 1 into (1)
we can obtain that Xk+1 = [Xk − (1 − Ik)]+ ≡ 0 if
X0 = 0. As a result, δk ≡ 0.
• If all the nodes in one class misbehave, some or all of
them may not be detected. Specifically, if they use the
same manipulated MAC parameters, the detector sees
that none of them is misbehaving; otherwise, at least
the one with the lowest throughput among them will be
considered as a normal node.
Therefore, to overcome the shortcomings of the FS detector,
only considering a single priority class is not enough. In the
following, we propose a novel hybrid-share detector based on
the following analytical MAC model.
III. MAC ANALYTICAL MODEL
For an arbitrary node v in class i, denote si as its percentage
of resource sharing. In this section, we propose a model for
calculating si. We assume there are c priority classes; each
contains ni nodes which compete for channel access using
parameters Wi = CWmini, CWmaxi = 2mi(Wi + 1) − 1
and AIFSi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ c and mi = log2 CWmaxi+1CWmini+1 is
the maximum backoff stage. Here, for simplicity, we assume
the maximum retransmission limit for node v is the same as
mi
1
. Thus, the contention window size of this node in its jth
backoff stage is
Wi,j = 2
j(Wi + 1)− 1. (3)
Let pi be the frame blocking probability, i.e., the probability
that node v senses a busy channel (and thereby suspends its
backoff timer countdown) in a generic slot. According to [10],
the transmitting probability of node v in a generic slot can be
calculated as
τi =
1− pmi+1i
(1− pi)
∑mi
j=0 p
j
i
[
1 + 11−pi
∑Wi,j
k=1
Wi,j−k
Wi,j
]
=
1− pmi+1i∑mi
j=0 p
j
i
(
1− pi +
Wi
2
)
=
2(1− pi)(1 − 2pi)
(1− 2pi)2 + (Wi + 1)(1− pi)
1−(2pi)mi+1
1−p
mi+1
i
. (4)
Let ∆Ai = AIFSNi − AIFSNmin where AIFSNmin =
min{AIFSNj|j = 1, . . . , c}. Due to differentiation in AIFS, a
node of low priority must wait a longer idle time than a high-
priority node after a busy channel period before resuming its
backoff timer countdown. Therefore, according to [11], the
frame blocking probability of node v can be calculated as
follows.
pi = 1−

(1− τi)ni−1 c∏
k=1,k 6=i
(1− τk)
nk


∆Ai+1
= 1−
[
1
1− τi
c∏
k=1
(1− τk)
nk
]∆Ai+1
= 1−
(
1− pb
1− τi
)∆Ai+1
, (5)
where
pb = 1−
c∏
k=1
(1− τk)
nk (6)
is the probability that the channel is busy in a random slot.
pb can be easily measured by the AP. Through the above
two equations, the AP can solve the probabilities τi and pi
numerically.
In a generic time slot, the probability that node v success-
fully transmits a packet to the AP is
ps,i = τi(1− τi)
ni−1
c∏
k=1,k 6=i
(1− τk)
nk
=
τi
1− τi
(1− pb). (7)
1In general cases, the hybrid share model will be slightly more complicated,
but our modeling methodology and the designed detector are still valid.
4Therefore, the percentage of resource sharing of node v (which
is also the probability that a successful transmission to the AP
is from this node) is given by
si =
ps,i∑c
j=1 njps,j
=
τi
1−τi∑c
j=1
njτj
1−τj
. (8)
The average number of packets (from any of the nodes)
received by the AP in one slot is
η =
Probability of a successful transmission
Average length of a slot time
=
ps
1− pb + psTs + (pb − ps)Tc
, (9)
where ps =
∑c
i=1 ps,i is the probability of a successful
transmission, while pb − ps is the probability of a collided
transmission. 1 − pb is the channel idle probability (i.e., the
probability that none of the nodes transmits). Ts and Tc are
the numbers of empty slots (i.e., aSlotTime as specified in
the standard) of a successful transmission and a collision,
respectively. In the case of basic access (without RTS/CTS
handshaking), we have [11]
Ts = AIFSNmin + L+ 2SIFS +ACK + 2δ, (10)
Tc = AIFSNmin + L+ SIFS +ACK + δ, (11)
where L is the length of a packet including the MAC and
PHY headers2. SIFS and ACK are durations of a short inter-
frame space and an ACK transmission period, respectively. δ
represents the propagation delay. The units of both Ts and
Tc are numbers of empty slots. For the cases with RTS/CTS
access mechanism, refer to [11] for the derivation of the
corresponding Ts and Tc. Then, the average number of empty
slots between two successive transmissions can be given by
T =
1
η
, (12)
which also describes the frequency of packet arrivals at the
AP. Note that, if each misbehaving node is treated as a distinct
priority class, the above is able to accommodate both normal
and misbehaving nodes.
IV. HYRID-SHARE DETECTOR DESIGN
For a target node belonging to priority class i, the hybrid-
share detector (called HS detector) is designed as follows. Due
to the high nonlinearity of (4) and (5), the numerical solution
of si may introduce some error, say ǫi. Let s¯i be the numerical
solution of (13), then
si = s¯i + ǫi. (13)
In the sequel, we shall omit the subscript i since the context
is clear. The detector maintains a state Xk with initial state
X0 = 0. Once a packet arrives at the AP, the detector state is
updated according to
Xk+1 = [Xk + (Ik − s¯)]
+
, (14)
2We assume all the packets are of the same length. Please refer to [12] for
the case with diverse packet lengths.
where Ik is defined below Eq. (1) and P[Ik = 1] = s.
Therefore, in normal cases, Xk is expected to remain in
[0, 1]. We introduce a new detection threshold h and make
the decision that whether the target node is misbehaving or
not by computing
δk =
{
1, if Xk ≥ h,
0, otherwise. (15)
Similar as above, δk = 1 indicates misbehaving.
Note that, in normal cases, Xk may be able to hit 1 if the
AP receives a packet from the target node. Therefore, for the
sake of correct detection, h can be set to larger than 1. For
detecting real-time misbehavior of the target node, Xk is reset
to 0 once it hits the threshold h. If there is only one access
class, s = 1
n
, and the HS detector reduces to an FS detector.
We call Xk as the state of the HS detector in step k. Note
that the step size may vary from time to time because the
packet arrivals at the AP are generally random. However, from
(12) we can obtain the average step size as T .
When applying the proposed detector, the AP only needs
to compute the MAC model and calculate the percentage of
resource sharing once, as long as the network configuration
and MAC parameters assigned to each node do not change.
As shown in (14), the computation complexity of the proposed
detector itself is very low. Therefore, it is worth noting that
the proposed detector is light-weight. Moreover, since all
received packets are utilized by the detector, misbehavior can
be detected in a real-time manner.
Definition 1: To evaluate the performance of the HS detec-
tor, we define the following metrics.
• The false positive rate pf of the HS detector is the
conditional probability that the target node is indicated
misbehaving (i.e., Xk is no less than the threshold h)
when in fact none of the nodes is misbehaving.
• The detection rate pd(D) of the HS detector is the
probability that a misbehaving node will be detected in
D time slots (empty slots defined in IEEE 802.11e).
pf can be viewed as the rate of false alarms, while pd(D)
reflects the effectiveness and real-time performance of the HS
detector. Below we analytically analyze the detector perfor-
mance by modeling pf and pd(D).
A. False positive rate
Without loss of generality, suppose there exists σ > 0
such that both s¯
σ
and 1−s¯
σ
are integers (say L0 and L1,
respectively). For example, we can use the precision of s¯ to
determine the above two integers. For any step k between
two adjacent detector state resettings, suppose there are k1
times that Iκ = 1 and k0 times that Iκ = 0, where κ
is between the last resetting step and k. Thus, based on
(14), Xk ∈ {0, Xk−1 − s¯, Xk−1 + 1 − s¯}. Furthermore,
Xk ≤ k1(1− s¯) which yields that
Xk ∈ {0, σ, 2σ, . . . , k1L1σ}. (16)
Since Xk is multiples of σ, its largest possible value is m¯σ
where m¯ = ⌈h
σ
⌉ (otherwise Xk is reset). Therefore, the
5support of Xk can be denoted as
M =
{
0,m1σ,m2σ, . . . , m¯σ
∣∣∣mj ∈ N+,mj < m¯}
⊆ {0, σ, 2σ, . . . , m¯σ}. (17)
Clearly, M is a finite set.
According to (14), Xk+1 depends only on Xk and thus the
sequence {Xk} forms a homogeneous Markov chain. Since
the support of Xk may vary from step to step, to calculate the
probabilities of the chain’s states at any step k, we can consider
the bigger set {0, σ, 2σ, . . . , m¯σ} without loss of generality.
Define
xk = [P[Xk = 0],P[Xk = σ], . . . ,P[Xk = m¯σ]] . (18)
By definition, we have x′k ∗ 1 = 1, where 1 is a vector with
all elements equal to 1. Due to the homogeneity of the chain,
we can have xk+1 = xkP, where P is the step-independent
probability transition matrix. P depends only on s and can be
also represented as P(s). Let Pi,j be the (i, j)th entry of P. To
describe P, let us consider the steady-state probabilities of the
chain {Xk}: pi = limk→∞ xk = [π0, π1, . . . , πm¯]. Apparently,
pi = piP. πm can be calculated by considering the following
scenarios:
• If m = 0, we have Xk = 0 which happens either if
Xk−1 ≤ s¯ and Ik−1 = 0 (i.e., the received packet is not
from the target node) or Xk = m¯σ and the state is reset
subsequently. Therefore,
π0 =
L0∑
i=0
πi(1− s) + πm¯, (19)
which indicates that Pi,0 = 1−s, ∀i ≤ L0 and Pm¯,0 = 1.
• If 0 < m ≤ L1, we have Xk−1 = (m+ L0)σ if Ik = 0.
Hence
πm = πm+L0(1− s). (20)
i.e., Pm+L0,m = 1− s.
• If 0 < m < m¯ − L0, we have Xk−1 = (m + L0)σ if
Ik = 0 and Xk−1 = (m− L1)σ} otherwise. Hence
πm = πm+L0(1− s) + πm−L1s
= πm+L0Pm+L0,m + πm−L1Pm−L1,m. (21)
• Otherwise if m¯−L0 ≤ m < m¯, we do not have the case
Ik = 0. Hence,
πm = πm−L1s = πm−L1Pm−L1,m. (22)
• Finally, when m = m¯,
πm¯ =
L1∑
i=1
πm¯−is =
L1∑
i=1
πm¯−iPm¯−i,m¯. (23)
Solving these equations, we can get a unique pi. Based on
Definition 1, the false positive rate is given by
pf = πm¯. (24)
B. Average Detection Rate
Suppose the target node starts to misbehave from step 0 on
and assume that the associated Markov chain {Xk} for the
normal case before step 0 has reached its steady state pi. Note
that, with the target node misbehaving (i.e., using different
CWmin and/or AIFSN), the MAC model changes. Hence, we
add superscript ∗ to the variables defined in previous sections
to distinguish the case that the target node is misbehaving from
the normal case. Since whether the target node misbehaves
or not is not pre-known to the detector, it shall assume that
the target node is well-behaving and still use s¯ to update its
state. Thus, the support of Xk remains the same as above.
The only difference lies in the probability of Ik = 1, which
in turn changes the probability transition matrix from P(s) to
P
∗ = P(s∗).
Then, starting at x0 = pi, the Markov chain associated
with the {Xk} evolves with xk+1 = xkP∗. By definition,
the average detection rate in time D can be calculated as
pd(D) = 1−
⌊ D
T∗
⌋∏
k=1
(1− P[Xk = m¯σ])
= 1−
⌊ D
T∗
⌋∏
k=1
(1− xm¯,k) , (25)
where ⌊ D
T∗
⌋ is the average number of steps in time D and
xm¯,k is the last element of xk.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Consider a WLAN with one AP and 15 nodes locating close
to each other so that they can hear each other’s transmissions.
The nodes are divided into three priority classes. In class 1,
there are n1 = 6 nodes each of which uses MAC parameters
W1 = 15, CWmax1 = 1023 and AIFSN1 = 7. For the other
two classes, we set n2 = 6, W2 = 15, AIFSN2 = 3, n3 = 3,
W3 = 7, and AIFSN3 = 2. CWmax is fixed at 1023 for
all the nodes. There is one node (the target node) in class 2
misbehaves.
To evaluate the false positive rate pf of the HS detector, we
consider the case that the target node well-behaves. As shown
in Fig. 2, pf decreases as the detection threshold h increases.
This is simply because the higher h is, the less opportunity
that the detector state Xk will hit its maximal value (i.e., m¯σ
as in (18)). The figure also shows that the numerical solution
error of the analytical model, as indicated by ǫ in (13), has
an impact on the rate pf : a smaller error can result in lower
false positive rate. However, since the second and third curves
are very close, we can see that a precision of 160 is enough to
deliver satisfactory results.
We then evaluate the detection rate of the HS detector by
considering the misbehaving node with various misbehaving
strategies. Fig. 3(a) shows the average detection rate pd(D)
under different misbehaving intensities, where we fix D = 100
and h = 2.5. As the misbehavior is intensified (i.e., the target
node uses a smaller AIFSN and/or CWmin), more received
packets are from the target node. Hence, the detector state
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increases more frequently and is more likely to hit its maximal
value. As a result, the average detection rate increases, which
is clearly depicted in this figure.
Fig. 3(b) shows the performance of the HS detector associ-
ated with the target node under different D and h, where the
misbehaving strategy is CWmin = 4 and AIFSN = 0. We can
see that, in all cases, the detector becomes more reliable with a
higher detection rate as the detection window gets longer. The
misbehavior will be captured almost surely when D is larger
than 80. However, a larger D indicates a longer detection
delay. In this sense, we should keep D small in order to detect
real-time misbehavior. For the similar reason as we discussed
above about Fig. 2, the higher the detection threshold is, the
lower the average detection rate will be achieved. However,
since pf and pd(D) are two conflict objectives, this figure
suggests to carefully choose h and D to balance them.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the problem of misbehavior detection
in IEEE 802.11e based networks where the nodes are able to
choose different priority levels and different MAC parameters.
We presented a mathematical model of the percentage of
resource sharing of each node, based on which we proposed a
hybrid-share detector. Theoretical performance of the detector
in terms of false positive rate and average detection rate had
been analyzed. Through numerical results, we demonstrated
that the false positive rate is sensitive to the detection threshold
but tolerable to the error involved in computing the MAC
model. The results also indicate that our analysis can help
choose proper detection threshold and window to meet real-
time requirement while balancing false positive rate and aver-
age detection rate.
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